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SPANISH BOOM-BUST AND MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY 
In this paper we review the experience of the last Spanish boom and bust to cast some 
reflections on macroprudential policy. These reflections take place in a country, Spain that 
is a (relatively small) member of a larger monetary union, which also has a single banking 
microsupervisor as well as a central bank, the ECB that can top-up national macroprudential 
decisions. Beyond the euro zone, the experience of the Spanish lending boom-bust maybe 
also interesting for other policy makers, with a full array of tools to tame the lending cycle.
Before the crisis that hit financial markets and banking systems in August 2007 bringing 
about the Great Recession in advanced economies, there was a broad consensus that 
monetary and fiscal policies should be used to manage the business cycle. In particular, at 
that time it was thought that monetary policy should play an active role while fiscal policy 
should be more passive, relying on powerful automatic stabilizers. In fact, if the main 
frictions in the economy are nominal, a monetary policy targeting a low level of inflation is 
enough to maximize social welfare. However, if real rigidities also play a relevant role, 
stabilizing inflation could amplify the cyclical fluctuations, thus justifying also a focus on 
output gap [Blanchard and Galí (2007)]. In any case, monetary and fiscal policies were the 
only instruments for carrying out macroeconomic tasks. 
Banking regulation and supervision were kept at the domain of microprudential policies, 
aiming at delivering a safe and sound banking system basically by ensuring the solvency 
of each individual bank in it. At the same time, the stance in banking regulation and 
supervision had progressively focused more and more on a proper level of capital against 
risk, as Basel 2 discussions, started in 1999, were trying to improve 1988 Basel 1 agreement 
deemed not enough risk-sensitive. 
The crisis and its high cost in terms of output, employment and taxpayers money to protect 
banks’ deposits, has deeply challenged the old policy paradigm. At the macroeconomic 
level, the great success in terms of low inflation of goods and services achieved the last 
two decades before the crisis,1 has been challenged in terms, first, of the imbalances that 
were developed at the same time (both internal and external) and, second, of the quite 
significant decline in output that many developed economies witnessed when those 
imbalances begun the correction process (see Chart 1). At a policy level, the strategy of 
mopping up (use monetary policy after a shock hits the economy) is now judged inferior to 
a leaning against the wind strategy were monetary (and fiscal) policies could have been 
used to prick asset bubbles in some markets or, at least, to tame earlier increased 
imbalances [Borio (2014)]. 
Moreover, a significant challenge is also for banking regulation and supervision strategy prior 
to the crisis. It is thought now that the microeconomic dimension (i.e. focus the analysis bank 
by bank, ensuring each one is safe and sound in itself) is not enough. In fact, from a theoretical 
perspective it has been shown that, in the presence of financial rigidities, the maximization 
of social welfare requires financial stability to be an additional target for the economic 
authorities, like inflation and output stabilization [IMF (2013)]. Thus, there is a growing 
consensus that banking regulation and supervision need to embrace also a macroprudential 
1  Part of the success in taming inflation was the result of the incorporation of emerging countries to international 
supply and trade circuits.
Abstract
1 Introduction
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dimension,2 focusing on the safety and soundness of the banking sector against systemic 
risk, that is, the risk of impairment of the normal working of a financial/banking sector that has 
an impact on the real economy. As financial conditions could amplify the fluctuations of the 
business cycle and the macroeconomic imbalances, it is argued that a macroprudential 
approach for banking supervision could have spotted problems earlier and contributed to 
reduce systemic risk materialization [De Larosière (2009)].
The new approach to banking regulation and supervision that is being adopted enlarges 
the traditional microprudential toolbox with other instruments that, albeit micro in essence, 
have a macroprudential aim. Basel 3 agreement includes a countercyclical capital buffer, 
aiming at reducing the time dimension of systemic risk, as well as a global systemically 
important banks (GSIB) capital surcharge, to reduce the cross-section dimension of 
systemic risk. The CRD IV/CRR in the European Union develop even further those 
macroprudential instruments enlarging the toolbox by including a systemic risk buffer and 
a potential surcharge for domestic systemically important banks. Other reforms, such as 
the progress in resolution mechanisms for large and complex banks, also try to reduce the 
interconnections in the financial system to reduce fragility. In parallel, capital requirements 
at the microprudential level have been reinforced increasing its minimum required level as 
well as its quality. In Europe, a macroprudential supervisor was created in 2011 (the 
European Systemic Risk Board), with the power to issue warnings and recommendations 
to states, national and supranational supervisors. Following one of its recommendations 
(ESRB 1/2013), macroprudential national authorities have been created in almost all 
European countries.
The interest on macroprudential policies and tools goes beyond banking regulation. 
A growing chorus of support is being developed for using macroprudential policies as an 
additional tool for macroeconomic policy. In this view, monetary policy should be used to 
target inflation, that is, price stability, (and output stabilization, like fiscal policy) while 
macroprudential tools could be targeted to the new goal: financial stability. From this 
perspective, there is not much interaction between monetary policy (and fiscal policy) and 
financial stability policies. They are two separated domains and should remain as such. 
Macroprudential tools should be able to tame systemic risk originated by large banks as 
well as that related to credit and financial cycle developments. Should a country face a too 
2  See Mencía and Saurina (2016) for a description of the macroprudential framework (i.e. indicators, instruments, 
objectives and policies) being developed by the Banco de España.
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rapid credit growth, countercyclical and/or systemic risk buffers together with, probably, 
time changing liquidity requirements, should be enough to control it. Sometimes, the 
ambition set for this macroprudential arm of policy is not modest as their supporters claim 
that it could have a substantial impact on the management of the business cycle, by 
affecting the lending cycle, and/or some real markets (i.e. impact on housing market via 
changes in loan-to-value – LTV – and loan-to-income – LTI – ratios). In a sense, a new 
paradigm is emerging attributing a much larger role to macroprudential policies in order to 
deliver financial stability or even less output volatility. A practical materialization of this 
paradigm is to observe that some central banks are organized along three “business lines”: 
monetary policy, financial stability/macroprudential policy, and banking (micro) supervision.3
Against this view of macroprudential policies and instruments, there are other more 
nuanced views where monetary policy, fiscal policy and macroprudential policies are all of 
them interconnected. The empirical evidence suggests that the interest rates can have a 
long-lasting effect on financial conditions;4 for instance, in a lending cycle the level of 
interest rates may have an impact on the level of credit risk that the banking sector is 
willing to take. There is a growing amount of literature supporting this so-called risk-taking 
channel of monetary policy.5 Similarly, the tax treatment of equity and debt may have an 
impact on the level of leverage households and firms may want to assume. Targeted taxes 
to the housing market may contribute to put sand in the wheels of too exuberant 
developments in the land, commercial real estate and/or housing markets, contributing to 
tame lending to such sectors and, therefore, the risks of financial instability. Moreover, the 
explicit and implicit guarantees provided to bank deposits and senior debt may also have 
had an important impact on the speed of the lending cycle (i.e. the housing boom could 
have been very different if construction and real estate developer firms had to fund their 
expansion by issuing directly uninsured debt to investors). On the other side, there is 
certain evidence showing that specific macroprudential tools can also affect the business 
cycle.6 This view is especially adequate for countries that, like Spain, are (relatively small) 
members of a monetary union (i.e. limited ability to use monetary policy) and, now, with an 
also limited capacity of actively using fiscal policy to accommodate shocks. 
The holistic view of the former paragraph is not yet supported by a fully fledged analytical 
framework. Moreover, the interrelationships among the three policy stances make the 
analysis complex and difficult to communicate to the public. In this respect, the aim of this 
paper is relatively modest. It tries to spur the debate of the usage of macroprudential tools, 
sketch the limits of what they can do and analyze the circumstances in which help from 
other policies may be required. We focus our analysis on Spain, as it has been one of the 
countries where the financial crisis has been more costly, even though some macroprudential 
tools were deployed well before financial imbalances developed in full. Besides, Spain is a 
member of the European monetary union, what could have relevant implications. Thus, 
section 2 looks at the lending boom and bust in Spain from a broad perspective, focusing 
on monetary, banking supervision, fiscal and macroprudential policies. Section 3 broadens 
the paper focusing at euro area countries and the challenges/opportunities for 
macroprudential policies that the lack of synchronization of the business and financial 
cycles under a common monetary policy may pose. Finally, in section 4 we conclude with 
some reflections extracted from the Spanish experience.
3  Haldane (2014) calls this the “3M” regime (monetary, macroprudential and microprudential).
4  See, for example, Zdzienicka et al. (2015).
5  See, for example, Jiménez et al. (2012, 2014) for an empirical analysis and Abbate and Thaler (2015), for a 
theoretical discussion. 
6  See, for example, Vuletin (2014).
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As shown in Chart 1, the Spanish economy registered a remarkable output growth during 
fourteen consecutive years before the Great Recession. Spain even managed to escape 
from the dot.com bust which affected other developed economies. However, this was at 
the cost of growing external and domestic imbalances by the private sector that, when the 
bust came, made the adjustment deeper and the recovery wavering until recent times.
In the years that preceded the monetary union inception, Spain had devaluated the old 
peseta by more than 30%, so the exchange rate at the end of 1998 was relatively 
competitive. At the same time, important efforts were made to fulfil the Maastrich 
convergence conditions, especially by reducing public deficit and inflation. The perspective 
of joining the monetary union resulted in a deep and quick reduction in interest rates 
before 1999 (600 basis points in four years). Putting all together, it is obvious that the 
expansionary demand shock hitting the Spanish economy was of an unprecedented size. 
Besides, the level of indebtedness of the private sector was moderate (total credit to the 
non-financial private sector represented around 100% of GDP) and, a few years later, 
abundant liquidity around the world allowed important capital flows entering in the Spanish 
economy looking for safe assets, channelled partially via covered bonds (so-called cédulas 
hipotecarias) and RMBS (Residential mortgage backed securities).7
At that time, not only financing was cheap and abundant, intensive immigration flows were 
observed (4.5 million people entered in the country in the same period, out of a total 
population of 45 million), adding labour to the capital influx and, probably, reinforcing each 
other dynamics. According to Arce et al. (2013), these conditions could only result in an 
overdevelopment of the residential construction sector, not only in terms of prices but also 
in terms of activity. In fact, between 1999 and 2007 housing prices in real terms rose by 
168% on a cumulative basis, the proportion of employment in those sectors increased 
from 5% to 13% and the weight of banking credit to the construction and real estate 
sector increased by 30 percentage points.8
Activity and employment in the construction sector started to diminish by the end of 2007, 
but it was at the turn of 2008 when the decline in activity spread to the rest of the economy 
and was substantially accelerated as a consequence of the international financial crisis. 
Initially, an expansionary fiscal policy was adopted and the financial sector was supported 
with liquidity measures. Later on, with the emergence of the Euro area sovereign crisis, fiscal 
policy turned restrictive, and the financial sector was restructured including important capital 
injections mostly on behalf of tax-payers. Besides, the accommodative monetary policy was 
counteracted by the segmentation of the financial markets in the Euro area. This, jointly with 
the deleveraging process of both households and firms, in a context of a protracted banking 
crisis and inflation well below the target, resulted in the important cumulative reduction in 
GDP already mentioned, as well as in a significant employment destruction. In fact, by the 
end of 2015, GDP was still 4% below the level reached in 2008Q2.
Analyzing how different policies reacted in such a situation could be of interest for policy 
makers in other countries facing a similar unprecedented expansionary shock.
7  For an analysis of the drivers of securitization in Spain, see Almazán et al. (2015).
8  Notice that the monetary union meant a process of interest rate convergence among country members with risk 
premium per country disappearing. This had an asymmetric impact across countries and assets. In particular, for 
Spain it meant a reduction in interest rates that had a positive impact on the prices of long term assets (as the 
discount factor decreased) such as houses. The initial pressure on prices may have not been met by the supply 
of assets given real constraints (i.e. available land, construction permits, the own building process…) so that 
prices jumped additionally, setting in motion a process that would end up in an overvaluation of houses and 
oversupply, but only years later. 
2  Boom and bust 
in Spain
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In the year 1999 the monetary policy in Spain was subject to a crucial structural change as a 
result of the monetary union. In being a member of that club, Spain gained in macroeconomic 
discipline, credibility and stability, but an important instrument of economic policy, the 
interest rate, was lost. 
A simple way of analysing the monetary policy stance consists on calculating the deviations 
of the central bank policy rate from that implied by a Taylor rule.9 The Taylor rule is a rule of 
thumb for interest rate determination by the monetary authorities. It implies that interest rates 
will be above (below) the equilibrium rate when inflation is higher (lower) than the target and/
or the output gap is positive (negative). A monetary union is characterized by a common 
interest rate for all the countries, so the inflation and output gap relevant would be those of 
the average conditions of the area as a whole.10 Thus, if there are divergences in the cyclical 
conditions or the inflation rate of the countries, monetary policy could be inadequate for them.
That seems to be the case of the Spanish economy. As can be seen in Chart 2 (panel A), 
before the Great Recession the ECB official rate was in line with that suggested by the 
Taylor rule for the euro zone as a whole. However, between 1999 and 2008 that common 
interest rate was permanently below that suggested by the Taylor rule for the Spanish 
economy (see Chart 2, panel B). As an average it was 380 basis points lower, reaching a 
maximum deviation by 2003 over 500 basis points.11 This implies that real interest rates 
were negative most of that period. After the financial crisis the situation changed 
dramatically, as the intervention interest rate is now above that implied by the Taylor rule; 
the maximum divergence was reached in 2014, although it was also quite significant in 
2015. In fact, the persistent indication by the Taylor rule of negative interest rates, which, 
from 2014, were also apparent for the euro area as a whole, suggested the need for 
unconventional monetary policy actions, which were finally adopted in a broad sense by 
mid 2014. In the Spanish case, this was more imperative when it is taken into account that 
the relevant interest rates for demand decisions in Spain showed a spread with respect to 
the euro area average, resulting from a fragmentation brought about by the sovereign 
9   In deriving the Taylor rule we have followed the procedure proposed by Hofmann and Bogdanova (2012), with 
minor innovations. See Annex 1 for details.
10  This means that the inflation and output gaps of the member countries should be weighted according to the 
private consumption/GDP of each economy. Benigno and López-Salido (2006), show that optimal weights 
could be different if the intensity of nominal rigidities is not the same across countries.
11  See Jordà et al. (2014) for a similar line of reasoning.
2.1 MONETARY POLICY
THE TAYLOR RULE CHART 2
SOURCES: ECB, Eurostat and own calculations.
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crisis which difficulted the transmission of monetary policy in the euro area. After the 
programmes implemented by the ECB that spread has diminished, but it is still positive. 
Besides, the interest rate does not fully reflect the very easy liquidity conditions that the 
Spanish economy enjoyed after the monetary union in 1999. As can be seen in Chart 3 
(panel A), between 1999 and 2007 capital inflows represented around 20% of GDP, while 
in the years previous to the monetary union they were around 7%. They accelerated 
sharply since 2004 with the deepening of securitization, which went from close to negligible 
in the early 2000s to over 50 billion Euros of securities issued every year (over 5% of 
GDP).12 In fact, most of this affluence of liquidity was in the form of debt instruments, 
which jumped from 5% of GDP before the monetary union to 15.5% between 1999 and 
2008. Behind that behaviour could be the structural change associated with being a 
member of an area macroeconomically more stable, but also a combination of search for 
yield and for scarce safe assets that the Spanish economy produced by developing the 
real estate sector and securitizating mortgage loans. As a result of this substantial influx of 
capital from abroad, the stock of foreign debt to GDP increased from a 57.5% of GDP in 
1998 to 148% in 2008 (see Chart 3, panel B).
After the financial crisis the situation changed radically, disappearing these flows, especially 
those based on debt instruments as a result of the reassessment of its soundness as well 
as their market prices.13 The Target system avoided a sudden stop.
This long period of very moderate interest rates, abundant liquidity and financial innovation 
derived in a quick process of increasing indebtedness and risk-taking by banks in the non-
financial private sector, which, as a percentage over GDP, increased from 103% at the 
beginning of 1999 to 206% at the end of 2007. It affected all the sectors, but especially the 
construction and real estate development activities. In fact, the bank credit to these 
12  See, for example, Jiménez et al. (2011).
13  Incidentally, asset managers are assessed (and paid) according to returns based on mark to market criteria. 
Therefore, even despite the low effective default rates in covered bonds (e.g. no default at all) and in Spanish 
RMBS, secondary market prices dropped substantially bringing about a rush for the exit of international 
bondholders, as soon as subprime crisis erupted and well in advance of the sovereign euro zone crisis. The 
decline in secondary prices was so pronounced that Spanish issuers (e.g. the banks) bought back some of 
these bonds booking a significant profit given the known and proven quality of the underlying assets (mortgages 
with a relatively low non-performing loan ratio).
SOURCES: Banco de España and own calculations.
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industries rocketed from 10% of GDP in 1999 to 42% in 2007 (see Chart 4), averaging 
nominal growth rates per year during that decade of 29%.14 The Chart also shows the 
intensity of the deleveraging process started in 2010, which accumulates a decline of 35 
percentage points. This was achieved mainly through debt amortization, which is one of 
the most costly (in terms of growth) ways of doing it.
All in all, a lax monetary policy stance, given the specific circumstances of the Spanish 
economy at the time, abundant liquidity in international markets, search for yield and the 
development of securitization allowed channelling funds from international investors into 
the Spanish banking market so that a lending cycle was inflated at a much higher speed 
than local deposits evolved. Viewed in retrospect (see Chart 5), the surge in credit from 
1999 (euro zone creation) till the beginning of the crisis (around 2008) was overwhelming. 
The correction afterwards has also been impressive. However, the participation of each 
individual bank in this credit expansion was different, as there were the lending standards 
applied by each of them.
14  A part of the increase of non-financial firms’ indebtedness is the result of their international expansion. Some 
large Spanish firms have been borrowing at home (from Spanish banks mainly) to acquire assets abroad. While 
the funding is registered in Spain, the assets are abroad, providing a steady and diversified stream of income 
to those firms.
NON-FINANCIAL PRIVATE CREDIT BY SECTORS AS A PERCENTAGE OVER GDP CHART 4
SOURCES: BIS, Banco de España and own calculations.
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The need for macroprudential policies and tools in banking regulation and supervision 
becomes evident when the risk exposition and financial instability of individual banks are 
insufficient to assess and manage the systemic risks emerging as a result of complex 
interdependencies among financial agents, including banks, within countries and cross 
borders. However, there is evidence too suggesting that macro-prudential tools, to be 
effective, will have to be sensible to banking supervision practices that are at the core of 
microprudential tools. 
In this section of the paper we provide some evidence to highlight the relevance of a 
proper diagnosis of the behavior and performance of individual banks in managing risks in 
designing supervision practices and effective microprudential tools.15 We will concentrate 
mainly in the credit risk. The sensitivity of credit risk of individual banks to the business 
and economic cycle is well documented16. In periods of economic expansion the ratio of 
NPL of all banks comes down and in periods of economic contraction all go up. But much 
less is known on what happens to the dispersion of NPL ratios in periods of both economic 
expansion and contraction.
Chart 6 shows clearly how much NPLs can change along time and across banks with data 
from Spanish banks. NPL ratios of credit to the private sector were at the peak of the 
lending boom in Spain below 1%, with little dispersion across banks (December 2006). By 
the second date, December 2009, once the worst recession in more than 60 years had hit 
the Spanish economy, NPL ratios had increased 8 times on average and, what is more 
important here, the dispersion of ratios across banks had increased substantially, with 
differences among high and low NPL ratios of more than 10 percentage points. Data at 
December 2013, when the Spanish economy had gone through a second recession and 
the housing bubble had burst, reinforces the message. The average NPL ratio in December 
2013 was more than 20 times the average in December 2006 and dispersion in the value 
of the ratio across banks has increased again, with difference between high and low NPL 
ratios across banks of more than 20 percentage points. 
Why dispersion in NPL ratios across banks is lower in periods of economic expansion 
and higher in recessions would deserve a more thorough analysis. At this point one could 
15  Our approach departs from Benabou (2009) collective delusions or groupthink and from Foote et al. (2012) 
wrong believes of borrowers and investors motives for the housing crisis. We do not exclude them, but we do 
believe that there were also other mechanisms at work with a significant impact in the final outcome. Our 
reasoning here is more in line with Schularick and Taylor (2012) as we analyze a large credit boom gone bust 
bringing about a systemic banking crisis.
16  See, among others, Rajan (1994), Salas and Saurina (2002) and Jiménez and Saurina (2006).
2.2  MICROPRUDENTIAL TOOLS
NON-PERFORMING LOANS RATIO IN THE NON FINANCIAL PRIVATE SECTOR BY CREDIT INSTITUTION
IN SELECTED PERIODS
CHART 6
SOURCES: Banco de España and own calculations.
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argue that the evidence in Chart 6 could be the result of different segment specialization 
by banks. That is, the differences could be just the result of some banks specializing on 
real estate funding (usually with a much higher NPL ratios during crisis) and others in 
mortgages (with usually lower NPL ratios). Charts 7 and 8 confirm that real estate 
exposures are much riskier than mortgages in Spain (average NPL ratio in end-2013 of 38% 
versus close to 6% in mortgages). However, more importantly, the pattern of dispersion 
of NPL ratios shown in Chart 6 appears again in both real estate and mortgage portfolios of 
bank loans. 
Since real estate loans are probably the most pro-cyclical ones (i.e. Chart 9 shows the 
evolution along the business cycle of lending concentration in construction and real 
estate exposures) it is worth mentioning here some additional features of lending to 
construction and real estate activities, observed in Spanish data. Chart 10 presents the 
growth rates of the bank credit to the construction and real estate activities in nominal 
terms (blue line), deflated by the housing price (red line) and growth of bank credit per 
construction firm (total credit divided by number of registered construction and real estate 
firms). During the expansionary period the average growth rate of the stock of credit to 
construction and real estate in nominal terms was 23%; this rate diminishes to 13% when 
it is deflated, and to 4% when it is calculated as growth of average credit per firm. 
If one would compare these growth rates with growth of real GDP, which averaged a rate of 
3.7% in the expansionary period, growth in credit per firm would have been considered 
“normal” and aligned with general trend of growth for the whole economy. The growth of 
NON-PERFORMING LOANS RATIO IN CONSTRUCTION AND REAL ESTATE BY CREDIT INSTITUTION
IN SELECTED PERIODS
CHART 7
SOURCES: Banco de España and own calculations.
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total credit, in nominal and in real terms was quite above the “normal”. To understand the 
different patterns of growth in credit to construction and real estate in the aggregate and 
per firm it is important to keep in mind the common practice in the construction sector of 
creating an independent legal firm under limited responsibility for each separate construction 
project, probably to protect the construction firm from risks of insolvency, but translating 
the risks to lenders, banks in this case, if that insolvency occurs. 
In the years of the crisis the restructuring of the construction and real estate sectors is 
done by closing down the numerous firms that were created in the expansion period. This 
is clear from Chart 10 if we notice that the fall in credit to the construction and real estate 
sector is high at the aggregate level but much lower in the credit per firm. Firms closing 
down in the recession were probably highly leveraged and if external collateral17 was low 
(since the crisis affected particularly hard the construction and real estate industry), the 
parent firms of these small subsidiaries attached to a particular construction project 
experienced insolvency situations in all the subsidiaries at the same time, so the insolvency 
of firms translated immediately into higher NPL of banks. 
What lessons can be drawn from these analyses? One can reasonably associate the 
change in the average level of NPLs along the economic cycle to the macroeconomic 
developments, but the observed dispersion in NPL across banks in the recession period 
17  See Jiménez et al. (2006) for the analysis of the determinants of bank collateral.
CONSTRUCTION AND REAL ESTATE EXPOSURES AS A PERCENTAGE OF LOANS TO THE NON-FINANCIAL 
PRIVATE SECTOR
CHART 9
SOURCES: Banco de España and own calculations.
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must respond also to other reasons. We conjecture that differences across banks must be, 
on average, the result of different lending standards in the boom phase. These differences 
in lending standards may in turn respond to different credit policies, different skills in 
screening and evaluating borrowers and their investment projects, to different compensation 
policies and managerial incentives,18 among other issues. The microprudential approach 
to banking stability must then reinforce the attention to banks’ policies and behavior in 
order to link them with lending decisions in good times that will be more or less sensible 
to expose the bank to high credit risk in less favorable macroeconomic conditions. The 
second lesson has to do with the relevance of tailoring the microprudential tools and 
supervision practices to the idiosyncratic ways of doing business in each sector of 
economic activity, and in particular to the implications for credit risk of lending to business 
groups of legally separated firms, or to corporations that manage all their assets and 
activities under a single entity. Legal entities are protected by limited responsibility even if 
they belong to a business group (single management unit) so a priori the guarantees 
lenders call for in lending decisions should be determined under this premise. Finally, the 
industry dimension approach is also relevant. Thus, the industry dimension in determining 
credit concentration restrictions should be reinforced. In any case, effective banking 
supervision requires a sound risk diversification according to Basel Committee Core 
Principles [BCBS (2012)], which are a guide to bank managers and bank supervisors for 
properly monitoring risks at banks. 
How can fiscal policy contribute to preserve the financial stability, if it has to? In this 
section we try to analyze some of the links between both macroeconomic policies using 
the Spanish experience. 
From a long term perspective, fiscal policy can support financial stability by strengthening 
the incentives to capital financing. And not only in the case of financial firms, but also for 
non-financial companies and households. Currently, the fiscal system applies a more 
favourable treatment to interest payments than dividends, thus implying a departure from 
Modigliani-Miller hypothesis, which raises the relative price of capital with respect to debt 
so that fostering the incentives of both households and firms to increase indebtedness 
and leverage. 
In the case of the financial institutions, BCBS (2010) presents evidence showing that 
higher capital ratios (i.e. lower leverage) reduce the probability of having a banking crisis, 
and, in case of having it, its costs in terms of GDP foregone. This result has been confirmed 
in the Spanish case using very long time series [Estrada and Argimón (2014)]. In the case 
of non financial companies, the fiscal treatment of interest payments in the corporation 
tax has implied that most of the globalization process of the Spanish firms undertaken in 
the last decades was financed by debt issued in Spain. Recently, a reform in the 
corporation tax has limited the possibility of deducting interest payments from the tax 
base. In the case of households, until 2013 they could also deduct part of the interest 
payments in their mortgages in the income tax, thus favouring low down-payments when 
buying a house.19 According to empirical evidence, low down-payments favour house 
price increases for a given interest rate [Bover (1992)] and increase the probability of 
default [Mayer et al. (2009)].
18  See, for instance, Williamson (1963), Esty (1997), Saurina and Shin (2012).
19  They could also deduct part of the principal, thus introducing a bias in favor of housing property instead of 
renting. Well developed and deep rental markets reduce the probability of housing bubbles [Arce and López-
Salido (2011)].
2.3  FISCAL POLICY
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Not only private debt, public debt is also crucial for financial stability, as banks usually 
maintain this asset in their portfolios. Therefore, a sound financial sector requires that 
fiscal authorities assure the sustainability of public debt. Sustainability is a forward 
looking concept that involves not only the current level of public debt, but also the future 
path of the public deficit. Thus, most of developed countries include in their laws explicit 
rules for the public deficit as a percentage over GDP and over maximum public expenditure 
growth. Besides, as the public pensions have characteristics of pay-as-you-go systems, 
internal automatic rules are being introduced in the regulation to face the aging problem. 
Spain is not an exception in this respect. In order to meet the Maastrich criteria on public 
debt (below 60% of GDP, see Chart 11), the main target of fiscal policy for joining the 
EMU was to reduce public debt, not only by constraining public deficits, but also by 
privatising public companies. By 2007 public debt had diminished to 36%, 30 percentage 
points below the average of the Euro area, helped also by the reduction in interest rates. 
Afterwards, it increased substantially, thus inducing a reform in the budgetary rules, 
introducing in 2011 the principles of the structural public balance equilibrium in the 
Constitution, and in the public pension system (2011 and 2013). 
From a medium term perspective, fiscal policy can be used countercyclically to dampen 
the fluctuations of the business cycle beyond the automatic stabilizers built into the fiscal 
system. During recessionary periods activity diminishes, unemployment increases and, as 
a consequence, NPLs increase, damaging the profits of banks and consuming capital. 
Therefore, leaving apart direct support measures to the financial sector itself, fiscal policy 
can contribute to the stability of the financial system in these periods by sustaining activity 
and avoiding self-reinforcing negative spirals. In the expansionary periods it can also 
contribute to the financial stability by moderating the increase in activity.20 
A look at the aggregate numbers of the Spanish public sector in the last fifteen years is 
revealing in this respect. As can be seen in Chart 12, at the euro inception public deficit 
was well below the limit established by the Stability and Growth Pact (3%) and it continued 
diminishing until reaching surpluses for three years in a row (2005-2007). The primary 
structural balance was in surplus all that period, and, in fact, it significantly increased from 
2004 to 2007, signalling a restrictive orientation in fiscal policy. When the crisis erupted, 
both headline and structural public balances recorded a substantial deficit, thus reflecting 
an initial expansionary orientation of fiscal policy, which turned to contractive afterwards, 
as financial turbulences reached the country. However, these outcomes in terms of the 
20  There is evidence showing that the steepest the expansion the deepest the posterior contraction [Bordo and 
Haubrich (2012)], so another way to put a floor to the recession is limiting the previous expansion.
PUBLIC DEBT OVER GDP CHART 11
SOURCE: Banco de España.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
% GPD
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 49 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 30
balances before the Great Recession were hiding increases in public expenditures well 
above potential growth (see Chart 13). Obviously, this can only be explained by public 
revenues, which were increasing even by more than expenditures. Part of that important 
increase of fiscal revenues was the result of automatic stabilizers, but other relevant part 
was the result of the overdevelopment of the housing sector. This revealed that not only 
fiscal rules on the balances need to be considered, but also on the public expenditure 
growth.21 After the recession, revenues severely contracted, while expenditures initially 
increased. Until 2014, revenues increased and expenditures diminished due to the 
discretionary measures adopted to control the public deficit.
But the capacity of the fiscal policy to influence the behaviour of some specific economic 
areas and, in particular, the housing sector, could be more interesting from the financial 
stability time perspective. The housing sector has played a capital role in the development 
of the recent banking crisis in Spain. However, Spain is not an outlier. There is overwhelming 
evidence showing the key role this sector plays in explaining financial instability both in 
different periods and across countries. In fact, the housing price is one of the indicators 
selected jointly with credit to estimate the financial cycle22 and it is almost always included 
21  That kind of behavior was the motivation for introducing a public expenditure rule in the recent reform of the 
fiscal governance of the European Union. 
      See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/index_en.htm.
22  See, for example, Claessens et al. (2011) or Borio et al. (2013).
BALANCES OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR OVER GDP CHART 12
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in the group of leading indicators of banking crisis. Claessens et al. (2011) find that 
recessions are longer and its costs in terms of forgone GDP higher when there is a housing 
price burst. 
Real estate activities are intensive in tax collection and taxes can influence the behaviour 
of the participants in these markets. In the Spanish case, capital gains are part of the fiscal 
base of the income tax, the corporation tax and a specific tax of municipalities; new house 
transactions are taxed by the VAT and second-house transactions by a specific regional 
levy; municipalities also collect taxes on land appreciation and obtain non-tax revenues by 
selling public land. Besides, the ownership of a house is also taxed by a local tax and 
imputed rents on secondary houses are also part of the fiscal base of the income tax. On 
the contrary, as we said before, until 2013 when a house was bought using a mortgage, 
part of the interest payments and the amortization of the principal were deductible in the 
income tax. These revenues constitute an important share of tax collection and were partly 
responsible of the unexpected increase in tax revenues during the expansionary period.23 
These taxes and fiscal benefits can be used to moderate housing demand, households 
leverage and housing price increase. Probably, the taxes most efficient in this respect are 
those related to the transmission of the real estate, as they impact directly and without 
delay on the housing market participants. The taxes whose fiscal base is the housing 
property will take more time to have an effect. 
The evidence of the impact of housing taxation in housing prices in Spain is relatively scarce 
as very few changes in taxation were recorded in the expansionary period. During the 
recession some modifications have been introduced but mainly with the objective of increasing 
fiscal revenues. Some simulations by early 2000’s pointed to reductions of housing prices 
between 16%-20% if deductions in the income tax were eliminated [López-García (2004)]. 
In fact, in the year 2006 this deduction in the income tax was cut; however, the reduction 
was moderate and, to some extent, financial sector innovation counteracted the measure, 
as long as the enlargement of mortgages maturity made non-binding the annual ceilings 
on the deduction. At the beginning of 2009 it was announced that by 2011 this measure 
for new buyers could be only applied by households with revenues below €24.000; in 
2013 it was completely eliminated after being recovered in 2012. A look at the evolution 
of housing prices and transactions seems to show relevant effects of these changes in 
the income tax (see Chart 14). As can be seen, right after the 2009 announcement housing 
transactions (normalized by per capita income) changed their downward trend, showing 
increases during 2010. This increase in demand implied a slower reduction of housing 
prices (again normalized by per capita income). These trends were fully reversed when 
the measure become effective. At the end of 2012 something similar happened, although 
to a lower extent.
However, these effects could be just the result of the once for all nature of that measure. 
More insights could be obtained from the regional transaction tax for second hand houses. 
Before the financial crisis, all the regions had the same tax (7%),24 but the fiscal 
consolidation process determined that some regions increased this rate in different years. 
In the year 2011 5 regions increased that tax by 1 or 2 percentage points; in the year 2013 
8 regions increased it by 1, 2 or even 3 percentage points. Chart 15 suggests that the 
23  According to Castro et al. (2008), the fiscal revenues associated to the real estate overdevelopment explain two 
out of the four percentage points that fiscal revenues over GDP increased at that time. Obviously, when the 
burst came all these revenues evaporated.
24  Except those of the special (foral) fiscal regime (6%).
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effects can be relevant. It presents the average change in house prices and transactions in 
the year after the tax was increased (minus the previous average change to control for the 
particular circumstances of each region) differentiating the regions where taxes were 
increased from the rest. In both years house prices declined by more in the regions that 
implemented rate increases and transactions increased by less. 
The results presented here on housing taxation are only suggestive on the power fiscal 
policy can have on financial stability in the short term. Taxes over land and house transactions 
together with fiscal treatment of mortgages and debt in general may have a significant 
impact on lending booms fuelled by house price increases or excess indebtedness.25 
Spain implemented dynamic provisions in mid-2000, short after it joined the monetary 
union. Dynamic provisions are now counted as a macroprudential tool. At the time they 
were implemented, the idea was strikingly simple: banks should build up a buffer in good 
times to be used in bad times to protect its solvency. Jiménez and Saurina (2006) provide 
an empirical rationale for such a countercyclical provision. During lending booms banks 
relax their lending standards (including collateral requirements) so that loans granted in 
25  From a different angle, Piketty and Zucman (2014) point out wealth-income ratios in Spain at the peak of the 
housing bubble of 800%, even larger than those observed in Japan in the late 1980’s. 
2.4 MACROPRUDENTIAL TOOLS
HOUSE PRICES AND TRANSACTIONS AND INCOME TAX DEDUCTION CHART 14
SOURCES: INE, Ministerio de Fomento and own calculations.
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good times are riskier. Competition is strong during booms so that risk pricing may be 
biased downwards. Bank managers’ incentives do the rest. This evidence matches 
supervisory experience in the sense that lending mistakes happen in good times, when 
over optimism about loan prospects is abundant together with disaster myopia and fading 
memories of the last recession gaining weight among lender officials at banks. Therefore, 
it makes a lot of sense to introduce a surcharge in provisions to cope with credit risk 
mispricing and to build up a buffer to protect the bank when the recession appears and 
lurking credit risk manifests itself in a jump in NPLs.
Dynamic provisions evolved somehow along time, in order to adjust to IFRS (International 
Financial Reporting Standards) being imposed in 2005 as well as to the crisis impact. 
A detailed description of dynamic provisions working can be found in Saurina (2009a) 
while a first impact study is in Saurina (2009b). A more thorough and complete review of 
the performance of dynamic provisions along a full lending/business cycle can be found in 
Trucharte and Saurina (2013).
Dynamic provisions are governed by a simple formula with two components. The first 
component is proportional to the increase in the credit portfolio; with different buckets 
proportional to risk (i.e. the parameter for mortgages is lower than the one for consumption 
loans, which are riskier). The second component, the pure countercyclical one, compares 
the current level of specific provisions with an average of the cycle. In good times credit 
grows rapidly, NPLs are very low so that specific provisions are very small and, thus, the 
two components are positive which means that dynamic provisions are being accumulated. 
In bad times credit slows or turns negative, NPLs surge and so do specific provisions. The 
two components of the formula become negative so that dynamic provisions are drawn and 
booked in the profit and loss account of the bank in order to cope with credit losses and to 
protect the solvency of the bank.
Chart 16 reveals the three major characteristics of dynamic provisions. First, the base for the 
provision is not only a pro-cyclical variable (credit), but it is more volatile than the business 
cycle (notice that range of the right axis is six times higher than that of the left axis). Second, 
although the rates for the different buckets of risks are constant along the cycle, the average 
rate is also procyclical. This is a consequence of buckets of higher risks gaining relevance 
in the expansionary periods and losing it in the downturns. This implies that these 
provisions increase by more than credit and much more than GDP in the expansionary 
phases and decline by more than credit and GDP in recessions. In analogy with the fiscal 
theory jargon, these two characteristics imply a sort of “progressivity” to this provision. 
BUSINESS AND CREDIT CYCLES AND NON-PERFORMING LOANS RATIO CHART 16
SOURCES: INE, Banco de España and own calculations.
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Third, the tool is fully automatic: no decision by the authorities is needed to accumulate or 
release the fund. The accumulation is activated when exposures increase and the release 
when loan impairments grow, as mentioned before. These two variables are positively and 
negatively correlated, respectively, with the business cycle. This is very similar to the 
working of the automatic stabilizers in fiscal policy. 
As a result, general provisions have shown a pro-cyclical behavior, which has counteracted 
to an important extent the highly countercyclical pattern characterizing specific provisions. 
Thus, according to Chart 17, between 2000 and 2005 banks increased generic provisions 
by more than credit, compensating the progressive decline in specific provisions associated 
to the reduced ratio of non-performing loans observed during that period. In particular, the 
ratio of total provisions over total credit increased by 0.4 percentage points compared to 
a reduction in specific provisions of 0.3 percentage points. In 2005 the implementation of 
the IFRS in Spain implied a reduction in the ceiling for generic provisions that determined 
a one for all reduction in that fund, remaining quite stable afterwards. By 2008, after non-
performing loans started to increase rapidly, the flow of generic provisions became 
negative, precisely when accounting rules determined a quicker accumulation of specific 
provisions. As the fund of generic provisions was positive, it was possible to use it (around 
0.5 percentage points) in order compensate part of the increase in the specific ones (1.4 
percentage points). Afterwards, the transitory improvement of the economic situation 
during 2011 was rapidly reflected in a new change in the trend of generic provisions, which 
increased additionally as a result of a one-off increase in the generic provision associated 
to real state exposures. The second dip of the economy during 2012-2013 and the 
corresponding increase in specific provisions were also cushioned by the use of cumulated 
generic provisions, although it was not enough to prevent a substantial decline in credit. 
More recently, the decline in non-performing loans in a context of still declining credit is 
determining a reduction in both general and specific provisions. 
In fact, the available empirical evidence in Jiménez et al. (2016) supports the view of 
countercyclical provisions as a useful tool for macroprudential policy. It has affected the 
behavior of banks, generated countercyclical capital buffers and mitigated the credit cycle. 
In particular, after the introduction of the countercyclical provisions in 2000, banks reduced 
committed lending and tightened the general conditions for loans with the firms they used 
to work. Besides, that reduction was higher for those banks that had to provision the most. 
However, in these good times, firms were able, after three or four quarters, to redirect loan 
demands to those banks less affected by provisions, thus resulting in maintenance of the 
PROVISIONS OF THE SPANISH CREDIT INSTITUTIONS AS A PERCENTAGE OVER TOTAL CREDIT CHART 17
SOURCES: INE, Banco de España and own calculations.
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overall level of borrowing. This last result also reveals the limits that macroprudential tools 
have due to leakage. In 2005, when countercyclical provision regulation was firstly 
modified, credit growth was also high. The empirical analysis results show a similar effect 
on credit to firms that after its introduction in 2000, but more muted, probably reflecting 
the relatively minor modification in the parameters.
On the contrary, by the end of 2008 a new modification in the regulation was introduced, 
diminishing the lower bound for the generic fund. This modification was introduced when 
the flow of credit was declining significantly, precisely to dampen that reduction. The evidence 
shows that the possibility of releasing more provisions in bad times helped in easing the 
credit conditions for firms and by most in the case of banks where the fund of provisions 
was closer to the floor. However, only well funded banks were able to ease the credit 
conditions to other firms they did not use to work with.
Thus, Spain was a pioneer among the developed countries in the introduction of 
countercyclical macro-prudential tools, despite the lack of interest from international 
regulators/supervisors at that time. In relative terms, dynamic provisions covered 1.1% of 
credit portfolios (1.5% for those with positive risk weights) and of almost 1% of total 
assets at the peak of the lending cycle. In terms of risk weighted assets, dynamic provisions 
reached 1.5% of credit risk weighted assets at the peak of the cycle, which is 60% from 
the maximum countercyclical capital buffer set at 2.5% in Basel 3. Dynamic provisions 
took around 15%/20% of the net operating income of each bank each quarter, which can 
explain the initial resistance of banks to dynamic provisioning, although they also 
acknowledged later on the proven benefits of these provisions in bad times. The assessment 
of dynamic provisions as a prudential tool must take into account that in the case of Spain 
were calibrated using the NPL and provision data of the 1993 recession, the worst in 30 
years at that time, while, the macroeconomic shock that hit Spanish banks in 2008 and after 
was of a magnitude far much larger. GDP decline in 1993 was a bit more than 1% while in 
2009 we had a 3.6% decline, followed by a double dip of another 3.3% in 2012 and 2013 
altogether. It is clear that dynamic provisions helped banks to survive the crisis along other 
instruments and measures but, at the same time, they were not enough for some banks 
given the size of the shock.
All in all, in line with the holistic approach we spouse in this paper, a macroprudential tool 
like dynamic provisions should have been accompanied probably by other countercyclical 
tools, such as higher capital requirements in good times, LTV and LTI mandatory thresholds, 
closer scrutiny of lending standards, including concentration risk, collateral valuation 
policies, and remuneration incentives. But, given the size of the lending wave, fiscal and 
monetary policy measures leaning more against the wind may have also helped to tame that 
credit expansion. As mentioned before, monetary policy is set for the whole euro area, which 
opens the possibility for macroprudential instruments being potentially very useful for dealing 
with the time dimension of the lending cycle. We explore this issue in the next section.26
Both academics and policy makers confer an especially relevant role to macroprudential 
policies in non-optimal monetary areas like the Euro area. The reason is that monetary 
policy cannot be used to stabilize the economy of a particular member when it is shocked 
by an asymmetric disturbance [Jeanne and Korinek (2014)], or when the reaction to a 
common disturbance is different due to the structural characteristics of that member 
26  Restoy (2015) argues along the same lines, insisting on the potential usefulness of macroprudential tools in 
monetary unions.
3  Real and financial 
cycles in the euro area
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state. It could be argued that fiscal policy should play that role of macroeconomic 
stabilization. However, in the near future, the fiscal space is going to be very reduced in 
most of the Euro area countries.27 
Angeloni (2014) also recognizes that role for the macroprudential policy, but only to 
smooth out local credit cycles and having in mind that the final purpose should be 
enhancing the resilience of the financial sector. However, this author also sees the risk 
that it could “(re-)introduce a domestic dimension to credit and, indirectly, to monetary 
policy.” In fact, the interaction between monetary policy and macroprudential policy is a 
question of enormous interest. Most of macroprudential tools can have an impact on 
inflation and activity. For example, an increase in the capital requirements of the banks 
could increase the financing cost of the economy; higher leverage ratios could reduce the 
financial resources to lend; a reduction in the loan-to-value threshold could mean a cut in the 
value of collateral.28 Macroprudential tools influence the transmission channels of monetary 
policy, both the traditional (substitution, income and wealth effects) and the balance sheet 
channel. Thus, it could happen that macroprudential policies reinforce the monetary policy 
decisions, but also that they counteract each other. Therefore, it is crucial the coordination 
among policies and member states. 
The evidence on the co-movements of the business cycles in the Euro area is quite wide. 
Before the financial crisis, Giannone et al. (2010) showed how, after the monetary union, 
the country specific properties of the business cycles did not change significantly, and the 
dispersion, which declined considerably before 1999, remained quite stable afterwards. 
However, these conclusions were challenged by the financial crisis. 
Chart 18 panel A reproduces the evolution of the unemployment rate dispersion29 analyzed 
in Estrada et al. (2013), jointly with that of the output gaps. As can be seen, before the 
financial crisis there was a process of real convergence in the unemployment rate, while 
the cyclical synchronization among Euro-12 countries was quite high. After the financial 
crisis, dispersion increased substantially for both indicators, overpassing the levels 
observed at the inception of the monetary union. It is true that dispersion has tended to 
behave countercyclically in the past; however, the levels reached in 2012 and 2013 were 
much higher than those observed for the same countries in 1993-1995, or compared to the 
current crisis in other developed economies. In the last two/three years a steady reduction 
is being registered, which coincides with the implementation of important measures both 
at the euro area and the country level. 
Panel B of the same Chart shows the histogram of the pair-wise correlations among the 
output gaps of the Euro-12 countries before and after the financial crisis. Before 2008, 
around 60% of the correlations were positive and relatively high (over 0.6). Besides, from 
a statistic perspective, there were no negative correlations; the distribution was clearly 
skewed to the right. After the crisis some countries have begun to diverge from others 
(20% of the correlations are negative) and the distribution has reduced its right skewness.
27  For instance, according to the European Commission, only five out of the nineteen Euro area members closed 
2015 with a public debt ratio below 60%, the threshold established by the fiscal governance in the excessive 
deficit procedure. 
28  A way to address these interactions could be through a cost-benefit analysis where the higher capital ratio 
reduces the output losses as it helps to containing banking crisis while, on the other hand, it increases the cost 
of lending and, thus it reduces the output of the economy. The huge cost of this last banking crisis in Spain and 
elsewhere probably will tilt the balance in favor of higher capital ratios for many years to come.
29  Calculated as the annual cross-country standard deviation of the corresponding variable. Using the first 
differences of the unemployment rate to proxy the cycle barely modifies this Chart.
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Thus, from the point of view of the business cycle, it seems that it is necessary to widen 
the tool kit of macroeconomic policies available for the national authorities to modulate the 
business cycle in a monetary union that, necessarily, applies the same monetary policy 
among all its members and at a time where fiscal room of maneouver is very small. An 
alternative better option would be the Euro area giving additional steps in order to mimic 
as much as possible to a fully fledged monetary union. Some steps are being taken in this 
direction by, for example, implementing the Banking Union. However, the fiscal dimension 
and, finally, the political one, should not be forgiven. Meanwhile, macroprudential policy 
could fulfill that necessity, although oriented to financial stability.
Financial and business cycles are not the same. Claessens et al. (2011) show that financial 
cycles are longer and sharper than business cycles. However, the synchronization 
degree between both cycles is quite high when the financial cycle is proxied with credit 
or housing prices. In the Euro area in particular, Haavio (2012), finds that financial cycles 
measured with house prices tend to precede business cycles and measured with credit 
to GDP to lag them. Less analysis has been made with respect to the synchronization of 
financial cycles across the Euro area member states. Here we present some exploratory 
results using the same tools than with the business cycles. We consider two variables to 
capture the financial cycle: the credit to the nonfinancial private sector to GDP gap 
calculated as recommended by the BIS30 to activate the countercyclical buffers and the 
real credit growth.
As can be seen in Chart 19, the results are somewhat different from those of the business 
cycle. Starting with the panel A, the dispersion of the credit to GDP gap is higher than that 
of credit growth. Besides, the dispersion in both indicators of credit conditions is higher 
than that of the business cycle. Therefore, although the Euro area countries had to satisfy 
certain convergence criteria, being among them financial variables like the interest rates, 
the financial conditions in terms of volumes were far from being homogeneous at the 
monetary union inception. 
In fact, the evolution of the credit indicators has been quite different since the monetary 
union creation. Although in the first years of the Euro, both indicators pointed to a 
30  See, for example, Drehmann and Tsatsaronis (2014).
BUSINESS CYCLE CO-MOVEMENTS IN THE EURO AREA CHART 18
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-convergence of the financial cycles in the area, by 2001 credit growth started to 
diverge, and by 2006 the credit to GDP gap. In both cases, the divergence started well 
before that of the business cycle, that in fact, by that time suggested a higher 
synchronization degree. At the years 2005 and 2009 the divergence of both credit 
indicators reached a maximum close to the level observed in 1999. The financial crisis 
determined a process of convergence that, apparently, has not had continuity in recent 
times. However, this is mainly due to the important declines of credit observed in 
Netherlands in 2014 and 2015.
Panel B of Chart 19 shows that in the expansionary years of the monetary union, the co-
movements in the credit growth among countries were positive, but the right skewness of 
the distribution was lower than that of the business cycle. After 2008 the distribution of the 
co-movements of credit growth has also flattened, appearing again quite high negative 
correlations. Thus, although the dispersion in credit growth has diminished after the 
financial crisis, it has been the result of very different paths in the different countries. The 
same chart using the credit to GDP gap provides a totally different outcome, a polarized 
distribution of highly negative and highly positive correlations before the recession and 
highly positive afterwards. These results can be interpreted as if the financial divergences 
before the crisis produced the illusion of a real convergence process that disappeared 
when they become unsustainable and the real adjustment took place [Praet (2014)]. 
Thus, it seems of crucial relevance to stabilize the financial cycle and to avoid financial 
divergences to arise in the euro area, also with the aim of not distorting the process of real 
business cycle convergence. Therefore, country specific macroprudential policies will 
have an important role to play in the euro area, as well as the ability of the ECB to top up 
them, which will counter any inaction bias national macroprudential authorities may 
display, at the risk of some overdoing. 
The huge lending boom and bust that the Spanish economy underwent since it joined the 
euro is, probably, a unique experience. It is relevant for both policy makers and academics 
interested in learning more about macroprudential policies and the real working of some 
of its instruments (countercyclical capital or provision buffers). The case of Spain is of 
particular importance because, as members of a large monetary union, monetary policy 
4 Conclusions
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decisions are based on the average needs of a large number of countries, while banking 
supervision is now subject to common methodologies applied by the SSM.31
Lending standards set by individual banks as part of their credit policies are key for 
ensuring safety and soundness of banks as well as for reducing systemic risk. The 
observed dispersion in NPL across banks that experience the same macroeconomic 
shock and are subject to the same capital standard regulations, suggest the relevance of 
better understanding the micro foundations of lending decisions of banks, and incorporating 
the lessons from the analysis into supervision practices instrumented at the microprudential 
level. Lending standards and policies of individual banks, understood in a broader sense 
(screening and monitoring of borrowers, limits to concentration of risks, the organization 
for the evaluation of collateral, corporate governance, compensation polices) should be 
strengthened within regulatory and supervision principles and practices. To comply with 
Core Principles [BCBS (2012)] regarding credit risk is a good starting point to avoid trouble 
further down in the lending cycle, although the issues related to credit risk maybe too 
diluted among the long list of principles and practices contemplated.
Macroprudential policy may not be equally important across countries and periods. It 
seems particularly more suited for (non-optimal) monetary areas than for countries that are 
fully in charge of monetary, fiscal and regulatory policies. Europe offers now a fertile ground 
to test this hypothesis with countries inside a large monetary zone with diverging business 
and financial cycle positions, while other countries outside the euro zone, either inside the 
European Union (UK, Sweden) or outside it (Norway, Switzerland) may be experimenting 
pressures in some markets (e.g. housing) under a better economic shape. Similarly, periods 
where monetary policy is focused on avoiding significant output losses and where fiscal 
room of manoeuvre is almost inexistent, macroprudential tools may be the only instruments 
left to reduce systemic risk in both dimensions, along time and across banks.
Macroprudential tools are in line with a prudent way of conducting public affairs: build up 
buffers in good times to be used in bad times [Crockett (2000)]. A very simple but powerful 
idea which, of course, is not new and is very close to automatic stabilizers in fiscal policy. 
This extended experience in the design of fiscal tools may be also taken on board now that 
the development of macroprudential tools is in their first steps, even though the average 
duration of a financial cycle is larger than that of the business cycle. 
Macroprudential tools aims are different from microprudential ones. Given the fact that 
macroprudential and microprudential tools (capital and liquidity ratios) are similar or even 
identical, the degree of coordination between macro and microprudential authorities 
should be as high as possible, in particular given the importance of monitoring the lending 
standards of each bank. The countercyclical capital buffer is such an example. During 
good times the buffer increases, helping to tame the lending cycle and/or building a nest 
that can be used in bad times. Basel 3 proposal is relatively automatic in terms of the build 
up as a function of the distance of the current level of credit to GDP to its trend. To be 
effective, the countercyclical capital buffer needs to be released in bad times, so that bank 
capital requirements are softened and banks do not feel the need to comply with them by 
trimming lending. Bank micro supervisors may be reluctant to release bank capital in bad 
times. If the microprudential view dominates, banks will reduce lending, unless convinced 
or forced to raise capital at a not very convenient time. Second round effects of that kind 
31  Some of the lessons may not be too different from the ones taken from other countries that have also endured 
a large banking crisis (US, UK...) but still, the monetary union membership confers to the Spanish experience 
an additional value added.
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of decisions may be a deepening of the recession that could erode the capital raised 
initially, leading to a self-defeating policy. From a macroprudential point of view, it is crucial 
to increase capital in good times so that banks have margin to reduce it in bad times 
without hurting too much the economy. The evidence we have for the Spanish case is 
compelling on that policy and the benefits it brings.32 Therefore, a close cooperation 
between micro and macroprudential authorities is needed. 
Similar to automatic fiscal stabilizers, countercyclical macroprudential tools should be 
automatic in both the build up and the release, if we want them to perform a macro service. 
This does not imply eliminating the possibility of adopting discretional decisions, but in 
exceptional circumstances and conditioned to a predefined plan for its release. One way to 
achieve at the same time separation and coordination of micro and macroprudential policies 
is by allocating the latter to a central bank, which is used to measure and manage the 
business cycle as well as systemic risk. If the central bank is also responsible for micro 
banking supervision (as, for instance, it is the ECB since November 2014 once the SSM has 
been set fully in motion, or is the case of the Bank of England now), the potential conflicts 
of interest are at least internalized. In any case, it is still important that inside a central bank 
with bank supervision, both areas, macro and microprudential supervision are separated so 
that one cannot stifle the other and both views are heard inside the central bank.
In any case, a significant amount of modesty is needed when designing and putting in place 
macroprudential tools. The holistic approach, precisely, hints that macroprudential tools are 
just a part of the toolbox of the policy maker and not always the most powerful ones. 
Finally, we would like to end up this essay by summoning researches to do more work on 
the interaction between monetary, fiscal, micro and macroprudential policies. The Spanish 
boom and bust lending cycle hints towards the need to analyze thoroughly not only the 
individual policies, as we have done in the paper, but also their potential interactions. For 
that purpose, we need to develop an analytical framework where heterogenous agents (i.e. 
households, non-financial firms, banks, government…) interact with each other, incurring 
credit risk, with potential significant systemic risk and real effects in response to both 
internal and external shocks, while at the same time there is a central bank with monetary 
policy, micro and macroprudential tools to be deployed to counter systemic risk and real 
effects damaging welfare. In this framework we will be able to find advice on which is the 
optimal mix of tools to maximize welfare and/or to minimize systemic risk. The task is not 
easy but it is worth pursuing.
ABBATE, A., and D. THALER (2015). Monetary policy and the asset risk-taking channel, Discussion Paper Deutsche 
Bundesbank, No. 48/2015.
ALMAZÁN, A., A. MARTÍN and J. SAURINA (2015). “Securitization and banks’ capital structure”, Review of Corporate 
Finance Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 206-238.
ANGELONI, I. (2014). “European Macroprudential Policy from Gestation to Infancy”, Financial Stability Review, 
Banque de France, No. 18, April, pp. 71-84.
ARCE, Ó., and J. D. LÓPEZ-SALIDO (2011). “Housing Bubbles”, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol. 3, 
No. 1, January, pp. 212-241. 
ARCE, Ó., J. M. CAMPA and Á. GAVILÁN (2013). “Macroeconomic Adjustment under Loose Financing Conditions in 
the Construction Sector”, European Economic Review, Vol. 59, April, pp. 19-34.
BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION (2010). “An Assessment of the Long-Term Economic Impact of 
Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements”, Consultative Document, August.
— (2012). “Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision”, September.
BÉNABOU, R. (2009). Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Working Paper No. 14764, March.
BENIGNO, P., and J. D. LÓPEZ-SALIDO (2006). “Inflation Persistence and Optimal Monetary Policy in the Euro 
Area”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 38, No. 3, April, pp. 587-614.
32  See Jiménez et al. (2016).
REFERENCES
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 60 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 30
BLANCHARD, O., and J. GALÍ (2007). “Real Wage Rigidities and the New Keynesian Model”, Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 36-65.
BORDO, M. D., and J. G. HAUBRICH (2012). Deep Recessions, Fast Recoveries, and Financial Crises: Evidence from 
the American Record, NBER Working Paper, No. 18194, June. 
BORIO C., P. DISYAYAT and M. JUSELIOUS (2013). Rethinking Potential Output: Embedding Information about the 
Financial Cycle, BIS Working Papers, No. 404, February. 
BORIO, C. (2014). Monetary Policy and Financial Stability: What Role in Prevention and Recovery?, BIS Working 
Papers, No. 440, January.
BOVER, O. (1992). An Empirical Model of House Prices in Spain (1976-1991), Working Papers, No. 9217, Banco de 
España.
CASTRO F., Á. ESTRADA, P. HERNÁNDEZ DE COS and F. MARTÍ (2008). ”Una aproximación al componente 
transitorio del saldo público en España”, Boletín Económico, June, Banco de España, pp. 71-81.
CLAESSENS, S., M. A. KOSE and M. E. TERRONES (2011). How Do Business and Financial Cycles Interact?, IMF 
Working Paper, No. 11/88.
CROCKETT, A., (2000). “Marrying the Micro- and Macro-prudential Dimensions of Financial Stability”, Eleventh 
International Conference of Banking Supervisors, held in Basel, pp. 20-21, September. 
DE LAROSIÈRE, J. (2009). “Report of the High-level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU”, Brussels, February.
DREHMANN, M., and K. TSATSARONIS (2014). “The Credit-to-GDP Gap and Countercyclical Capital Buffers: 
Questions and Answers”, BIS Quarterly Review, March, pp. 55-73.
ESTRADA, Á., and I. ARGIMÓN (2014). “Impact Analysis on the Structural Measures Improving the Resilience of EU 
Credit Institutions”, mimeo. 
ESTRADA, Á., J. GALÍ and J. D. LÓPEZ-SALIDO (2013). “Patterns of Convergence and Divergence in the Euro Area”, 
IMF Economic Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4, pp. 601-630.
ESTY, B. C. (1997). “Organizational Form and Risk Taking in the Savings and Loan Industry”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 44, No. 1, pp. 25-55.
FOOTE, CH. L., K. S. GERARDI and P. S. WILLEN (2012). Why Did so Many People Make So Many Ex Post Bad 
Decisions? The Causes of the Foreclosure Crisis, FRB Boston and NBER, April.
GIANNONE, D., M. LENZA and L. REICHLIN (2010). “Business Cycles in the Euro Area”, in Europe and the Euro, ed. 
by Alberto Alesina and Francesco Giavazzi (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press), pp. 141-169.
HAAVIO, M. (2012). “Financial Cycles and Business Cycles: Some Stylized Facts”, BoF Online, No. 1-2012.
HALDANE, A. G. (2014). “Central Bank Psychology”, speech given at the Royal Society of Medicine, available at: 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2014/speech776.pdf
HOFMANN, B., and B. BOGDANOVA (2012). “Taylor Rules and Monetary Policy: a global ‘Great Deviation’?”, BIS 
Quarterly Review, September, pp. 37-49.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (2013). The Interaction of Monetary Policy and Macroprudential Policies.
JEANNE, O., and A. KORINEK (2014). “Macroprudential Policy beyond Banking Regulation”, Financial Stability 
Review, Banque de France, No. 18, April, pp. 163-170.
JIMÉNEZ, G., and J. SAURINA (2006). “Credit cycles, credit risk, and prudential regulation”, International Journal of 
Central Banking, No. 2, Vol. 2, pp. 65-98.
JIMÉNEZ, G., V. SALAS and J. SAURINA (2006). “Determinants of colateral”, Journal of Financial Economics, No. 81, 
pp. 255-281.
JIMÉNEZ, G., A. MIAN, J. L. PEYDRÓ and J. SAURINA (2011). Local versus aggregate lending channels: the effects 
of securitization on corporate credit supply, Working Papers, No. 1124, Banco de España.
JIMÉNEZ, G., S. ONGENA, J. L. PEYDRÓ and J. SAURINA (2012). “Credit Supply and Monetary Policy: Identifying 
the Bank Balance-Sheet Channel with Loan Applications”, American Economic Review, No. 5, Vol. 102, August, 
pp. 2301-2326.
— (2014). “Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: what do Twenty-three Million Bank Loans Say about the Effects of 
Monetary Policy on Credit Risk-Taking?”, Econometrica, No. 82, Vol. 2, March, pp. 463-505.
— (2016). “Macroprudential Policy, Countercyclical Bank Capital Buffers and Credit Supply: Evidence from the 
Spanish Dynamic Provisioning Experiments”, Forthcoming, Journal of Political Economy.
JORDÀ, O., M. SCHULARICK and A. M. TAYLOR (2014). Betting the house, HKIMR Working Paper No. 31/2014.
LÓPEZ-GARCÍA, M. A. (2004). “Housing, Prices and Tax Policy in Spain”, Spanish Econonomic Review, No. 6, pp. 29-52. 
MAYER, C., K. PENCE and S. SHERLUND (2009). “The Rise in Mortgage Defaults”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
No. 23, Vol. 1, pp. 27-50.
MENCÍA, J., and J. SAURINA (2016). Macroprudential Policy: Objectives, Instruments and Indicators, Occasional 
Papers, No. 1601, Banco de España.
PRAET, P. (2014). “The Financial Cycle and Real Convergence in the Euro Area”, speech at the Annual Hyman 
P. Minsky Conference on the State of the US and World Economies, Washington DC, April.
PIKETTY, T., and G. ZUCMAN (2014). “Capital is Back: Wealth-Income Ratios in Rich Countries 1700-2010”, The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, May, pp. 1255-1310.
RAJAN, R. (1994). “Why Bank Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence”, Quaterly Journal of 
Economics, 109 (2), pp. 399-441.
— (2005). “Has financial development made the world riskier?”, Proceedings of the Jackson Hole Conference.
RESTOY, F. (2015). “Macro-prudential policies within a multi-country monetary union”, Conference of Financial 
Stability and Macro-Prudential Policy (Lisbon).
SALAS, V., and J. SAURINA (2002). “Credit Risk in Two Institutional Regimes: Spanish Commercial and Savings 
Banks”, Journal of Financial Services Research, 22:3, pp. 203-224.
SAURINA, J. (2009a). “Dynamic provisioning. The experience of Spain”, Crisis Response. Public Policy for the 
Private Sector, Note No. 7, July, The World Bank. 
— (2009b). “Loan Loss Provisions in Spain. A Working Macroprudential Tool”, Estabilidad Financiera, No. 17, Banco 
de España, pp. 11-26.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 61 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 30
SAURINA, J., and H. S. SHIN (2012). “Bank Capital Constraints and Lending Booms”, December, Mimeo.
SCHULARICK, M., and A. TAYLOR (2012). “Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles, and 
Financial Crises, 1870-2008”, American Economic Review, No. 102 (2), pp. 1029-1061.
SHIN, H. S. (2012). “Global banking glut and loan risk premium”, IMF Economic Review, No. 60, pp. 155-192.
SVENSSON, L. E. O. (2014). Why leaning against the wind is the wrong monetary policy for Sweden, working paper.
TRUCHARTE, C., and J. SAURINA (2013). “Spanish dynamic provisions: main numerical features”, Estabilidad 
financiera, No. 25, Banco de España, pp. 11-47. 
VULETIN, G. (2014). Effects and role of macroprudential policy, Brackground paper, World Developmet Report, The 
Brookings Institution.
WILLIAMSON, O. (1963). “Managerial discretion and business behavior”, American Economic Review, No. 53, 
December, pp. 1032-1057. 
ZDZIENICKA, A., S. CHEN, F. DIAZ-KALAN, S. LASEEN and K. SVIRYDZENKA (2015). Effects of Monetary and 
Macroprudential Policies on Financial Conditions: Evidence from the United States, IMF Working Papers, 
WP/15/288.
The Taylor rule has been obtained using a relatively standard procedure [Hofmann and 
Bogdanova (2012)]. The concrete expression is the following:
i = c + r * + π * + 1.5 (π – π * ) + 0.5 (y – y * )
where i is the relevant interest rate for the monetary policy, r* the long term real interest 
rate, π the inflation, π* target inflation, y the GDP and y* its potential level. c is the constant 
that makes the residuals of this relation zero in the average of the sample period.
Thus, this expression shows how the monetary policy intervention interest rate increases 
when positive deviations of inflation from its target arise. This coefficient should be higher 
than 1, to guarantee that real interest rates increase that inducing a downward adjustment 
in demand. Interest rates also increase when the ouput gap is positive, to drive demand to 
potential output.
In the empirical approximation two inflation indicators are considered: headline and 
underlying. Underlying inflation excludes the prices of energy products and non-elaborated 
food, which allegedly react more to specific supply shocks than to demand pressure. That 
way we adopt a neutral view on how monetary policy should react to sectoral supply 
shocks that could imply second round effects on other costs in the future. The inflation 
target corresponds to that announced by the corresponding central bank; when such a 
target did not exist, an average of inflation in the sample period is used.
We consider three estimates of potential growth: i) the H-P filter with smoothing parameter 
10; ii) H-P filter with smoothing parameter 100 ; and the estimate of the IMF, which relies 
on a structural model.33 The first statistical filter implies shorter and less persistent cycles 
compared to the second one. The IMF procedure is more robust form an economic 
perspective, as it considers the informational content of other variables to estimate 
potential growth. 
Finally, the long term interest rate is proxied with the growth rate of potential output. As, 
theoretically, potential growth should be equal to the relevant user cost of capital, a 
constant is allowed in the Taylor rule to capture the depreciation arte and the risk premium 
investors have to pay. In this empirical application, that constant shows a structural break 
in all the countries analyzed in the new millennium.
33  These estimates can be found in: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/index.aspx. 
Annex 1.  Derivation 
of Taylor rule
